REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
DICK THORNBURGH AND LOUIS D. BOCCARDI
ON THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY SEGMENT
"FOR THE RECORD"
CONCERNING PRESIDENT BUSH'S TEXAS AIR NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE
JANUARY 5, 2005
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART
NICHOLSON
GRAHAM
LLP
Michael J. Missal, Esq.
Lawrence
Coe
Lanpher,
Esq.
1800
Massachusetts
Avenue,
N.W.
Washington,
D.C.
20036
(202)
778-9000
Counsel to the Independent Review Panel
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
II.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................4
A.
60 Minutes Wednesday Background..............................................................................6
B.
The Pursuit of a Story on President Bush's TexANG Service ......................................7
C. Obtaining
Documents ....................................................................................................8
D.
The Production of the September 8 Segment ................................................................8
1.
Efforts To Authenticate Documents ........................................................................9
2.
Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents....................................................11
3. Barnes
Interview ....................................................................................................12
4.
White House Reaction ...........................................................................................13
E. The
Vetting
Process .....................................................................................................13
F.
Authenticity of the Killian Documents ........................................................................18
G. The
Aftermath..............................................................................................................19
1.
The Initial Response ..............................................................................................20
2.
The ABC News Report ..........................................................................................23
3.
The Statements of Marian Carr Knox....................................................................24
4.
The Change in Source............................................................................................25
5. The
Apology ..........................................................................................................25
6.
The Contact With the Kerry Campaign .................................................................26
H. Political
Agenda...........................................................................................................28
I. Recommendations........................................................................................................28
III.
PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION.................................................................................31
IV.
BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................................34
A.
60 Minutes The Sunday Show ..................................................................................34
B.
60 Minutes Wednesday ................................................................................................34
V.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY..................36
A. Introduction..................................................................................................................36
B.
Description of the Organization...................................................................................36
1.
Correspondents, Producers and Associate Producers ............................................36
2.
Executive Producer and The Senior Broadcast Producer ......................................38
3.
Additional Layers of Review .................................................................................38
4.
CBS' Communications Group ...............................................................................39
C.
The Unique Characteristics of the Production Process for the September 8
Segment........................................................................................................................39
i
VI.
BACKGROUND ON CBS NEWS STANDARDS, THE TEXAS AIR
NATIONAL GUARD AND DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION..............................41
A.
CBS News Standards ...................................................................................................41
B.
Texas Air National Guard Background .......................................................................41
C.
Background on Document Authentication...................................................................42
VII. THE PRODUCTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 REPORT ........................................44
A.
The Initial Pursuit of the Story in 1999 .......................................................................45
B.
The Continuing Investigation in 2000 .........................................................................49
C.
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett's National Media Appearances in February 2004...........51
1. Lieutenant
Colonel
Burkett's Allegations .............................................................52
2. Lieutenant
Colonel
Burkett's Retractions..............................................................53
3.
Additional Questions Raised Regarding Lieutenant Colonel Burkett's
Allegations .............................................................................................................53
4.
Doubts at CBS News .............................................................................................55
5.
Mapes' Awareness of the Lieutenant Colonel Burkett News Coverage................56
D.
The Continued Pursuit of a TexANG Story in the Summer of 2004...........................56
1.
Following the Leads...............................................................................................57
2.
Mounting Pressure To Get a Story.........................................................................58
E.
The Potential for Documents Between Monday, August 23, 2004 Thursday,
September 1, 2004 .......................................................................................................59
1.
Courting Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.....................................................................59
2.
Background Research on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett...........................................62
3.
Mapes' Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
Regarding the Shifting Focus of the Story and Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett's Requests .................................................................................................63
4. Mapes'
Initial
Contact
with the Kerry Campaign..................................................64
5.
The Involvement of Dan Rather ............................................................................66
6.
Ben Barnes' Speech at a Kerry Campaign Rally...................................................66
7.
Other News Media Coverage of TexANG Issues Between August 23,
2004 and September 1, 2004..................................................................................67
F.
Thursday, September 2, 2004 Monday September 6, 2004......................................68
1.
Thursday, September 2: The First Two Documents Were Obtained.....................68
a. Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett .............................................................68
b. Preliminary Review of the Documents ..................................................................70
c. Contact with Rather ...............................................................................................71
2.
Friday, September 3, 2004: Additional Reporting and The Search for
Document Examiners.............................................................................................72
a. Additional
Reporting .............................................................................................72
b. Retention of the Document Examiners ..................................................................73
(i) Qualifications of the Handwriting and Document Examiners.........................76
ii
(ii) The Panel's Findings Regarding the Examiner Selection Process ..................77
c. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett's Lawyer ...............................77
d. Mapes' Communications with 60 Minutes Wednesday Management
Regarding Additional Burkett Demands................................................................79
3.
Saturday, September 4, 2004: The Authentication Process Continued and
Other Issues............................................................................................................80
a. Contacts with the Document Examiners................................................................80
b. Other Background Reporting.................................................................................80
c. Rather's
Involvement.............................................................................................81
d. Mapes' Communications with Murphy .................................................................82
4.
Sunday, September 5, 2004: Document Authentication Issues,
Interviewing and Contact with Lockhart ...............................................................82
a. Additional
Documents
from
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett......................................82
b. Further Attempts To Confirm the Killian Documents' Content............................83
c. Concerns and Issues First Raised by the Document Examiners ............................84
(i) Emily Will........................................................................................................84
(ii) Linda James .....................................................................................................85
(iii)James Pierce.....................................................................................................85
(iv) Marcel Matley..................................................................................................86
d. Lieutenant Strong Interview ..................................................................................86
e. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett Regarding the Source and
Efforts To Find Chief Warrant Officer Conn ........................................................89
f. Mapes' Contact with Joe Lockhart ........................................................................91
g. Return to New York and Discussion About the Documents .................................93
5.
Press Coverage of TexANG Issues and the Timing of the September 8
Segment..................................................................................................................93
6.
Monday, September 6, 2004: The Matley Interview and the Call with
Major General Hodges...........................................................................................95
a. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett ...............................................95
b. Colonel Hackworth Interview................................................................................96
c. Discussions Regarding When To Contact the White House .................................97
d. Matley Interview....................................................................................................98
(i) Meetings with Matley Prior to the Interview...................................................98
(ii) The Matley Interview.......................................................................................99
e. Telephone Call with Major General Hodges .......................................................101
f. Communications
with Senior Management.........................................................104
G.
Tuesday, September 7, 2004: Additional Interviews and the Vetting Process
Begins ........................................................................................................................104
1.
Additional Attempts To Locate People Who Might Know About the
Documents ...........................................................................................................105
2.
Contact with the Document Examiners and Their Concerns About the
Documents ...........................................................................................................106
a. Emily Will............................................................................................................106
b. Linda James .........................................................................................................108
c. Marcel
Matley......................................................................................................108
d. James Pierce.........................................................................................................109
iii
e. Colonel
Charles....................................................................................................109
f. Search for Other Document Examiners ...............................................................109
g. Miller's Concerns................................................................................................110
h. Alerting Management ..........................................................................................110
3. Vetting
Sessions...................................................................................................111
a. The Questions Mapes Was Asked .......................................................................112
b. Representations Made About the Source.............................................................112
c. Representations Made About the Document Examiners and the
Documents ...........................................................................................................113
d. Kartiganer's Review of the Transcripts ...............................................................114
4.
Ben Barnes Interview...........................................................................................115
5.
The Promotion of the September 8 Segment .......................................................116
6.
Notifying the White House ..................................................................................116
7.
Two New Articles on Missing Records ...............................................................117
H.
Wednesday, September 8, 2004: Completing the Vetting Process and Airing
the Segment................................................................................................................118
1. Bartlett
Interview .................................................................................................118
2. Vetting
Meeting ...................................................................................................120
a. Discussion of the Documents...............................................................................120
b. The Source ...........................................................................................................121
c. Colonel
Hackworth ..............................................................................................122
d. The Document Examiners....................................................................................122
e. Deficiencies in the Vetting Process .....................................................................123
3. Response
at
60 Minutes Wednesday to the White House Interview....................124
4. Script
Revisions ...................................................................................................124
5. First
Screening .....................................................................................................125
6.
Decision to Air the Show.....................................................................................126
7.
CBS Evening News Promotional Piece: Late Afternoon......................................126
8. Final
Screening ....................................................................................................126
I.
The September 8 Segment Contained Inaccurate and Misleading Statements..........127
1.
The Document Authentication Statement Lacked Support .................................127
2.
The Lieutenant Strong Interview Excerpts Conveyed Inaccurate
Information ..........................................................................................................127
3.
The Ben Barnes Interview Excerpts Were Misleading........................................130
VIII. WHETHER THE CONTENT AND FORMAT OF THE KILLIAN
DOCUMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OFFICIAL BUSH
RECORDS ......................................................................................................................133
A.
Comparing the Content of the Killian Documents and the Official Bush
Records ......................................................................................................................135
1.
February 2, 1972 Memorandum ..........................................................................139
2.
May 4, 1972 Memorandum .................................................................................140
3.
May 19, 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Killian Memo to File.....................................141
4.
August 1, 1972 Memorandum .............................................................................142
iv
5.
June 24 and August 18, 1973 Memoranda...........................................................144
B.
The Language and Format of the Killian Documents Do Not Match Those of
the Official Bush Records..........................................................................................145
1.
Location of the Signature Block ..........................................................................146
2.
Format of the Killian Signature Block.................................................................146
3.
Abbreviation of "Texas Air National Guard"......................................................147
4.
Abbreviation of "Fighter Interceptor Squadron" .................................................148
5.
Abbreviation of "Group" .....................................................................................148
6.
Abbreviation of "Officer Efficiency Report" ......................................................148
7.
Abbreviation of "Lieutenant" ..............................................................................148
8.
Proper Term for Evaluation Board ......................................................................149
9.
Memorandum Addressed to "Sir"........................................................................149
10. The
Superscript
"th" ............................................................................................149
C.
Concluding Observations on Meshing of Content and Language .............................150
IX.
THE AFTERMATH ......................................................................................................151
A. General
Observations.................................................................................................151
B.
September 8-9 The Initial Attacks ..........................................................................153
C.
CBS News Strategy, September 10-13, 2004 ............................................................159
1.
Andrew Heyward's September 10 Directive .......................................................159
2.
CBS News' Public Defense of the September 8 Segment...................................162
a. Development of the Strategy: The September 10 Conference Call....................162
b. The September 10 Press Statement......................................................................164
c. Failure to Have Experts to Defend the Documents and the September 10,
2004 CBS Evening News Broadcast.....................................................................166
d. 60 Minutes Wednesday Failed to Reassess Its Reporting ....................................173
(i) The Hunt for New Examiners........................................................................174
(ii) Conversations with Peter Tytell.....................................................................174
(iii)Major General Hodges...................................................................................175
(iv) Failure to Reassess CBS News' Reporting....................................................178
e. September 11, 2004 .............................................................................................178
f. The Continued Defense: September 12-13 .........................................................182
D.
The Beginning of Changes in CBS News Strategy: September 14-15......................187
1.
The Initial Strategy on September 14 was Unchanged........................................187
2.
Disclosure that Two 60 Minutes Wednesday Document Examiners Had
Concerns About the Killian Documents ..............................................................192
3. Knox's
Revelations..............................................................................................194
E.
60 Minutes Wednesday Develops a New Strategy Beginning September 15............199
1.
September 15 and 16............................................................................................199
2.
The First Indication of Contact with the Kerry Campaign and the On-
Camera Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett: September 17-18 .................201
3.
Events Leading to the September 20 Apology ....................................................202
v
4.
The Lockhart Disclosures ....................................................................................208
X.
WHETHER THERE WAS A POLITICAL AGENDA DRIVING THE
SEPTEMBER 8 SEGMENT.........................................................................................211
A.
Information that Might Suggest a Political Agenda ..................................................212
1.
Rather and Mapes' Long Pursuit of the TexANG Story......................................212
2.
The Anti-Bush Sources ........................................................................................212
3.
Proposed Use of Colonel Hackworth...................................................................213
4.
Kerry Campaign Connections..............................................................................214
B.
Factors that Support a Conclusion that a Political Agenda Did Not Motivate
the September 8 Segment...........................................................................................214
1.
The Previous Work of Rather and Mapes............................................................214
2.
The Editing Process Added Balance....................................................................215
3.
Assuming the Killian Documents Were Authentic, They Added New Data
to the Bush TexANG Record...............................................................................216
XI.
RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................................217
XII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................221
vi
EXHIBITS AND APPENDICES INDEX
Exhibits
Exhibits 1A-1L
Transcripts of 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News
Broadcasts Regarding the September 8 Segment
1A
CBS Evening News, September 8
1B
60 Minutes Wednesday, September 8
1C
CBS Evening News, September 9
1D
CBS Evening News, September 10
1E
CBS Weekend News, September 11
1F
CBS Evening News, September 13
1G
CBS Evening News, September 14
1H
CBS Evening News, September 15
1I
60 Minutes Wednesday, September 15
1J
CBS Evening News, September 20
1K
CBS Evening News, September 21
1L
CBS Evening News, September 22
Exhibits 2A-2F
Documents Received from Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2
and
5,
2004
2A
February 2, 1972 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to
Major
Harris
2B
May 4, 1972 Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Killian to
Lieutenant
Bush
2C
May 19, 1972 Memo to File by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
2D
August 1, 1972 Memorandum for Record by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
2E
June 24, 1973 Memorandum to "Sir" by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
vii
2F
August 18, 1973 Memo to File by Lieutenant Colonel Killian
Exhibits 3A-3L
CBS News Media Statements Regarding the September 8 Segment
3A
September 7 CBS News Promotion of Ben Barnes Interview
3B
September 8 CBS News Promotion of Ben Barnes Interview
3C
September 9 CBS News Statement
3D
September 10 CBS News Statement
3E
September 10 CBS News Media Alert
3F
September 10 CBS News Promotion of a CBS Evening News Report on
the
September
8
Segment
3G
September 13 CBS News Promotion of a CBS Evening News Report on
the
September
8
Segment
3H
September 15 CBS News Promotion of September 15 60 Minutes
Wednesday Segment
3I
September 20 CBS News Statement
3J
September 20 Dan Rather Statement
3K
September 21 CBS News Statement
3L
September 22 CBS News Statement
Exhibit 4
Emily Will e-mail, September 5
Exhibit 5
Marcel Matley Handwritten Notes, September 6
Exhibit 6
Marcel Matley Typed-Up Handwritten Notes, September 10
Exhibit 7
Marcel Matley and James Pierce Draft and Final Letters, September 14
Exhibit 8
Dan Rather WCBS Interview, September 20
viii
Exhibit 9A-9K
Transcripts of Interviews related to the September 8 Segment and related
CBS Evening News Reports (attached only to Web versions of this
Report)
9A
Ben Barnes Interview Transcript, September 7, 2004
9B
Dan Bartlett Interview Transcript, September 8, 2004
9C
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett Interview Transcript, September 18, 2004
9D
Bill Glennon Interview Transcript, September 13, 2004
9E
Colonel David Hackworth Interview Transcript, September 6, 2004
9F
Richard Katz Interview Transcript, September 13, 2004
9G
Marian Carr Knox Interview Transcript, September 15, 2004
9H
Marcel Matley Interview Transcript, September 6, 2004
9I
Marcel Matley Interview Transcript, September 10, 2004
9J
Jim Moore Interview Transcript, September 10, 2004
9K
James Pierce Interview Transcript, September 14, 2004
9L
Robert Strong Interview Transcript, September 5, 2004
Appendices
Appendix 1
CBS News Standards Relevant to the Panel's Report
Appendix 2
Background Data on Document Authentication
Appendix 3
Official Bush Records Relevant to Chapter VIII
Appendix 4
Panel's Observations about Peter Tytell's views on the Authenticity of the
Killian
Documents
ix
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 2004, CBS News' 60 Minutes Wednesday aired a segment entitled "For
the Record" (the "September 8 Segment" or the "Segment") concerning President Bush's Texas
Air National Guard ("TexANG") service.1 The first part of the Segment was an interview with
Ben Barnes, the former Lieutenant Governor of Texas and Speaker of the Texas House of
Representatives, who said that he had recommended that President Bush be given preferential
treatment to obtain a position in the TexANG in 1968. Whether President Bush had received
such preferential treatment had previously been the subject of many news stories dating back to
1994 when he first ran for public office.
The second part of the September 8 Segment highlighted four documents2 obtained by
60 Minutes Wednesday just a few days earlier. These documents were allegedly "taken from"
the personal files of the late Lieutenant Colonel Jerry B. Killian, the Commander of the 111th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron in which then-Lieutenant Bush served from May 1968 to October
1973. These documents, which were said to provide new information on Lieutenant Bush's
TexANG service, were:
1. A memorandum dated May 4, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian ordered
Lieutenant Bush to take his annual flying physical;
2. A file memorandum dated May 19, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian
discussed a conversation with Lieutenant Bush about a transfer from Texas to
Alabama to work on a political campaign, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Killian's
displeasure with the requested transfer;
3. A memorandum dated August 1, 1972 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that
he ordered Lieutenant Bush suspended from flight status due to his failure to meet
TexANG standards and his failure to take his required flying physical; and
1 Transcripts of the September 8 Segment and the other 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS Evening News reports
pertaining to the Segment that aired from September 8 through September 22 are attached as Exhibits 1A-1L to this
Report.
2 These four documents, along with two others obtained by 60 Minutes Wednesday, are referred to collectively as
the "Killian documents." Copies of the six Killian documents are attached as Exhibits 2A-2F to this Report.
1
4. A file memorandum dated August 18, 1973 in which Lieutenant Colonel Killian
stated that a retired TexANG General was putting pressure on various officers to
"sugar coat" Lieutenant Bush's officer evaluation.
In referring to the Killian documents, the September 8 Segment reported that 60 Minutes
Wednesday "consulted with a handwriting analyst and document expert who believes the
material is authentic." In further support of the documents, former TexANG Lieutenant Robert
Strong, identified as a "friend and colleague of Colonel Jerry Killian," was asked whether there
was "any doubt in your mind that these are genuine?" Lieutenant Strong responded, "Well, they
are compatible with the way that business was done at that time. They are compatible with the
man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don't see anything in the documents that are
discordant with what were the times, what were the situations, and what were the people that
were involved."
Within hours after the Segment aired, questions about the authenticity of the Killian
documents were raised, initially in an outpouring from the so-called blogosphere3 on the Internet.
These early questions focused mainly on the typography of the documents. Specifically, it was
claimed that since the documents contained a superscript "th," were proportionally spaced and
had Times New Roman font style, they must be forgeries because typewriters in existence at the
time the documents were purportedly written did not have the capabilities to produce these
features. This was quickly followed by a raging media firestorm in print, on the air and on the
Internet about the documents' authenticity. In response to this crisis, CBS News issued a
number of statements and broadcast additional reports between September 9 and 15 defending
the Segment and the authenticity of the documents (the "Aftermath").4 Finally, on
September 20, 2004, Andrew Heyward, President of CBS News, issued a statement that said,
among other things, "Based on what we now know, CBS News cannot prove that the documents
are authentic, which is the only acceptable journalistic standard to justify using them in the
report. We should not have used them. That was a mistake we deeply regret."
On September 22, 2004, CBS News announced the appointment of an Independent
Review Panel consisting of Dick Thornburgh, former Attorney General of the United States, and
3 A blog is a website that contains an online personal journal, often with reflections, comments, and hyperlinks
provided by the writer.
4 Copies of the CBS News press statements issued in connection with the Segment between September 8 and
September 22 are attached as Exhibits 3A-3L to this Report.
2
Louis D. Boccardi, former Chief Executive Officer and President of The Associated Press, (the
"Panel") to examine the process by which the September 8 Segment was prepared and broadcast.
The Panel was also asked to examine the circumstances surrounding the public statements and
news reports by CBS News after September 8 defending the Segment, as well as to make any
recommendations it deemed appropriate. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP was
retained as counsel to the Panel.
3
II. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The stated goal of CBS News is to have a reputation for journalism of the highest quality
and unimpeachable integrity. To meet this objective, CBS News expects its personnel to adhere
to published internal Standards based on two core principles: accuracy and fairness. The Panel
finds that both the September 8 Segment itself and the statements and news reports by CBS
News that followed the Segment failed to meet either of these core principles.
The Panel has not been able to conclude with absolute certainty whether the Killian
documents are authentic or forgeries. However, the Panel has identified a number of issues that
raise serious questions about the authenticity of the documents and their content. With better
reporting, these questions should have been raised before the September 8 Segment aired.
While the focus of the Panel's investigation at the outset was on the Killian documents,
the investigation quickly identified considerable and fundamental deficiencies relating to the
reporting and production of the September 8 Segment and the statements and news reports
during the Aftermath. These problems were caused primarily by a myopic zeal to be the first
news organization to broadcast what was believed to be a new story about President Bush's
TexANG service, and the rigid and blind defense of the Segment after it aired despite numerous
indications of its shortcomings.
The most serious defects in the reporting and production of the September 8 Segment
were:
1. The failure to obtain clear authentication of any of the Killian documents from any
document examiner;
2. The false statement in the September 8 Segment that an expert had authenticated the
Killian documents when all he had done was authenticate one signature from one
document used in the Segment;
3. The failure of 60 Minutes Wednesday management to scrutinize the publicly
available, and at times controversial, background of the source of the documents,
retired Texas Army National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett;
4. The failure to find and interview the individual who was understood at the outset to
be Lieutenant Colonel Burkett's source of the Killian documents, and thus to
establish the chain of custody;
4
5. The failure to establish a basis for the statement in the Segment that the documents
"were taken from Colonel Killian's personal files";
6. The failure to develop adequate corroboration to support the statements in the Killian
documents and to carefully compare the Killian documents to official TexANG
records, which would have identified, at a minimum, notable inconsistencies in
content and format;
7. The failure to interview a range of former National Guardsmen who served with
Lieutenant Colonel Killian and who had different perspectives about the documents;
8. The misleading impression conveyed in the Segment that Lieutenant Strong had
authenticated the content of the documents when he did not have the personal
knowledge to do so;
9. The failure to have a vetting process capable of dealing effectively with the
production speed, significance and sensitivity of the Segment; and
10. The telephone call prior to the Segment's airing by the producer of the Segment to a
senior campaign official of Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry - a clear
conflict of interest - that created the appearance of a political bias.
Once questions were raised about the September 8 Segment, the reporting thereafter was
mishandled and compounded the damage done. Among the more egregious shortcomings during
the Aftermath were:
1. The strident defense of the September 8 Segment by CBS News without adequately
probing whether any of the questions raised had merit;
2. Allowing many of the same individuals who produced and vetted the by-then
controversial September 8 Segment to also produce the follow-up news reports
defending the Segment;
3. The inaccurate press statements issued by CBS News after the broadcast of the
Segment that the source of the documents was "unimpeachable" and that experts had
vouched for their authenticity;
4. The misleading stories defending the Segment that aired on the CBS Evening News
after September 8 despite strong and multiple indications of serious flaws;
5
5. The efforts by 60 Minutes Wednesday to find additional document examiners who
would vouch for the authenticity of the documents instead of identifying the best
examiners available regardless of whether they would support this position; and
6. Preparing news stories that sought to support the Segment, instead of providing
accurate and balanced coverage of a raging controversy.
The Panel expresses the earnest hope, however, that the failures identified in this Report
will not induce timidity at CBS News or chill its investigative reporting. Done accurately and
fairly, investigative reporting serves a critical role in a free society. Done inaccurately, it can
cause great harm. The recommendations made by the Panel at the end of this Report will, we
hope and expect, strengthen 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS News' capacity to fulfill this role.
A.
60 Minutes Wednesday Background
60 Minutes Wednesday first aired in 1999. While similar in format and concept to the
original 60 Minutes which began in 1968 and which continues to air on Sunday, there is little
overlap between the two shows. They have separate staffs and offices, and work on distinct
stories.
At 60 Minutes Wednesday, the Executive Producer and Senior Broadcast Producer are
ultimately responsible for the production of the stories that are broadcast. They work closely
with correspondents and producers to identify and develop stories. They also are responsible for
determining the appropriate amount of vetting that a segment needs before it is ready for
broadcast.
Executive Producer Josh Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Mary Murphy were the
senior producers for the September 8 Segment. Senior Producer Esther Kartiganer, who is
responsible for ensuring that excerpts of any interview used in a story are a fair representation of
the entire interview, assisted them in the vetting of the Segment. All three assumed their
positions with 60 Minutes Wednesday during the summer of 2004. They each had significant
experience at CBS News and all had previously worked at 60 Minutes.
The September 8 Segment was the first original story aired for which Howard was the
Executive Producer and Murphy was the Senior Broadcast Producer. Moreover, neither had an
extensive working relationship with either Dan Rather or Mary Mapes, the correspondent and
producer, respectively, of the September 8 Segment. The Panel recognizes that an effective
working relationship between an Executive or Senior Broadcast Producer and the people who
6
investigate and produce a show can take time to develop. This consideration, along with the
production speed, significance and sensitivity of the story, caused the President of CBS News,
Andrew Heyward, to task his direct report, Betsy West, Senior Vice President, Prime Time, CBS
News, with closer supervision of the production of the Segment than was typical.
Correspondents at 60 Minutes Wednesday work with producers they select to develop
ideas for stories and to prepare a story once the concept is approved by 60 Minutes Wednesday
management. The correspondents have varying degrees of involvement in investigating and
developing stories, and the producers typically take the lead in this process. Rather and Mapes
had worked together for more than five years, and Rather gave Mapes significant responsibility
to produce stories, in part due to the great confidence and respect that he had for her work, and in
part due to the demands of Rather's other duties at CBS News. In late August and early
September 2004, as the September 8 Segment was being developed, Rather had even greater
demands on his time than usual as he was covering the Republican Convention in New York
City and then a hurricane in Florida. Thus, he was not able to spend extensive time on the
development of the September 8 Segment.
Mapes has been with CBS News since 1989 and joined 60 Minutes Wednesday in 1999,
working exclusively as a producer assigned to Rather. Mapes was described by many people
interviewed by the Panel as one of the most highly regarded producers at 60 Minutes Wednesday.
Mapes' reputation grew dramatically in 2003 and 2004 as she produced a number of noteworthy
stories with Rather, including segments on Senator Strom Thurmond's biracial daughter and the
Abu Ghraib prison abuses.
B.
The Pursuit of a Story on President Bush's TexANG Service
The interests of Rather and Mapes in pursuing a story about President Bush's TexANG
service date back to at least 1999. At that time, and again during the presidential election of
2000, they investigated allegations that then-Texas Governor Bush had received preferential
treatment in getting into the TexANG in 1968. Although Rather did two interviews about the
subject in 1999, no story was put together for airing. They did little further investigating on this
matter until 2004, when numerous stories appeared in the media about both presidential
candidates' military service during the Vietnam War era.
7
C. Obtaining
Documents
On August 23, 2004, Mapes learned from a source that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett might
have a previously unreleased document related to President Bush's TexANG service. Mapes
believed that a number of news organizations were pursuing this same document from him. She
and Michael Smith, a freelance journalist from Texas who was working with Mapes on this
story, thereafter had a number of conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Burkett in an effort to
determine whether he had the document. Ultimately, Mapes and Smith met with Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett and his wife on Thursday, September 2, when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
provided Mapes and Smith with two of the Killian documents: the August 1, 1972 memorandum
and another document dated June 24, 1973, which was not used on the September 8 Segment.
On September 5, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided Smith with four more documents, three of
which were to be used on the September 8 Segment.
Smith told the Panel that when Lieutenant Colonel Burkett provided the documents on
September 2, he said that he had received them anonymously in the mail. Mapes had a different
recollection of what Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said at the same meeting about the source of the
documents. Mapes said that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett stated that he received the documents
after he was interviewed on a national television show in February 2004 concerning President
Bush's TexANG service, but did not say how he received them or from whom. Mapes added
that she spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on several occasions over the next couple of days to
get more information about the source of the documents. Ultimately, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
told Mapes on either September 4 or 5 that he had received the documents from another former
Texas Army National Guardsman, Chief Warrant Officer George Conn, a statement that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett would later admit was not true. Mapes and her team of associate
producers did virtually nothing to attempt to contact Chief Warrant Officer Conn to confirm this
story and further trace the chain of custody of the documents.
D.
The Production of the September 8 Segment
Once the documents were obtained by Mapes and Smith, there was a frenetic effort to
"crash" the Segment, meaning to prepare the Segment for broadcast quickly. Among other
things, the documents needed to be authenticated, five interviews had to be taped, including with
former Lieutenant Governor Barnes, and with White House Communications Director Dan
8
Bartlett, and the script for the story needed to be written and vetted. Despite this enormous
amount of work and the great sensitivity of the subject matter, it was decided to move up the date
the story would air from September 29, the first scheduled show for the 60 Minutes Wednesday
fall season, to September 8, a mere six days after the first Killian documents were obtained and
only three days after the four other Killian documents were received. This decision on timing
was driven in significant part by competitive pressures, as other news organizations were
working on stories related to President Bush's TexANG service.
1.
Efforts To Authenticate Documents
Since Mapes' regular associate producer was out on maternity leave, another associate
producer with whom she had not previously worked, Yvonne Miller, was assigned late on
Thursday, September 2, to assist Mapes in putting the story together. The first assignment that
Mapes gave to Miller on Friday, September 3, was to have the documents authenticated. Neither
Mapes nor Miller had any prior experience in document or handwriting analysis or the
mechanics of document authentication.
The field of forensic document examination is fraught with controversy and has differing
and sometimes antagonistic certifying organizations. However, it is generally agreed that
authentication of a document is best done with the original, so that a chemical analysis of the ink
and paper, as well as a close review of any signature and the typography, can be conducted. In
addition, document examiners typically reach their conclusions with varying degrees of
certainty. A common finding is that the document in question does not have any indication that
it is not authentic.
Given the tight deadline, Miller did not have sufficient time to learn the fundamentals of
document authentication. Had she known the basics, she would have realized that it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to authenticate the Killian documents because they were
copies, the alleged author was dead and no person could be located who was alleged to have
been present when the documents were prepared. She instead called various people who she
believed had experience in the document and handwriting field to identify potential examiners
with requisite expertise. After approximately six hours of work on Friday, September 3, Miller
had found four examiners who seemed to have expertise in document and handwriting
authentication and who were willing to work over the Labor Day weekend.
9
The four examiners initially were provided with the two documents obtained from
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on September 2: (i) the June 24, 1973 memorandum, which was not
used in the Segment but included a signature which purported to be that of Lieutenant Colonel
Killian; and (ii) the August 1, 1972 memorandum, which only contained initials. The four
examiners also were provided with 17 other pages of documents from Lieutenant Bush's
TexANG records that had been obtained from the government via requests pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") (the "official Bush records") so that Lieutenant Colonel
Killian's purported signature on the June 24, 1973 memorandum could be compared with his
signatures on those documents.
Over the next few days, the examiners analyzed the two documents and had several
conversations with both Mapes and Miller. Two of the examiners told the Panel that they
informed Mapes and Miller that they had various concerns about the documents. Significantly,
all four of the examiners told the Panel that they informed Mapes and Miller that they could not
authenticate the documents, primarily because they were copies.
One of the examiners, Marcel Matley, informed Miller on September 5 that based on his
initial review, he believed that the signatures from the June 24, 1973 memorandum and those
from the official Bush records were from the same person since he noticed "consistent
inconsistencies." Mapes decided to bring Matley to New York on September 6 to be interviewed
for the September 8 Segment. When Matley arrived in New York, he was shown the four other
documents provided by Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on the previous day. Matley told the Panel
that he informed Mapes and Miller at the time that he could not authenticate the documents, and
Matley's contemporaneous notes from September 6 support this recollection.5 Instead, Matley
advised Mapes and Miller that he could comment only on the signatures of Lieutenant Colonel
Killian that were included in some of the documents. Matley opined that while one of the
signatures of Lieutenant Colonel Killian that he had examined had "conspicuous differences"
from signatures on the official Bush records, the "preponderance of available handwriting
evidence" was that one person had written all of the signatures. Matley repeated this opinion in
an interview with Rather that evening. It was ultimately decided not to include any portion of
the Matley interview in the September 8 Segment, at least in part because it was felt that Matley
did not clearly explain his opinion.
5 Copies of Matley's handwritten notes from September 6 are attached as Exhibit 5 to this Report.
10
2.
Efforts to Verify the Content of the Documents
Aside from the efforts to authenticate the documents, Mapes also attempted to locate
people who could verify the content of the documents. One such person contacted by Mapes
was Lieutenant Robert Strong, who had served as an administrative officer in the TexANG.
Lieutenant Strong had previously been interviewed by Rather for a possible story in 1999. At
that time, he was asked about preferential treatment in getting into the TexANG, and he said that
a number of people appeared to get preferential treatment. He noted at the time, however, that he
had no personal knowledge about whether Lieutenant Bush received preferential treatment in
getting into the TexANG.
On September 5, as the production of the September 8 Segment gathered force, Rather
left his coverage of a hurricane in Florida to interview Lieutenant Strong in Austin, Texas.
Mapes was also present at the interview. Lieutenant Strong was shown the Killian documents
for the first time 20 minutes before the interview began. During the interview, Lieutenant Strong
was asked whether he had any doubt that the documents were genuine. Lieutenant Strong
responded, "Well, they are compatible with the way business was done at that time. They are
compatible with the man that I remember Jerry Killian being. I don't see anything in the
documents that are discordant with what were the times, what were the situations and what were
the people that were involved." This response was included in the September 8 Segment.
The Panel finds this use of Lieutenant Strong's statement to be misleading. Lieutenant
Strong told the Panel that he resigned from the TexANG in March 1972, two months before the
date of the earliest Killian document used in the September 8 Segment, that he had no personal
knowledge of Lieutenant Bush's service in the TexANG, and that he did not have any personal
knowledge of the content of the documents. Lieutenant Strong explained to the Panel that he
gave the response he did because Mapes had assured him that four experts were in the process of
authenticating the documents. Lieutenant Strong advised the Panel that his response should have
included the caveat that he did not have any personal knowledge of the content of the documents,
but if they were authentic, then they reflected the "principles" of Lieutenant Colonel Killian.
Rather and Mapes arrived back in New York after the Lieutenant Strong interview early
in the morning of September 6. The rush to prepare the Segment for possible broadcast on
September 8 continued in full force. Among other matters, Mapes called Major General Bobby
Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Killian's commanding officer during the relevant time period, on
11
Monday, September 6 to discuss the content of the Killian documents. Mapes told the Panel that
Major General Hodges would not agree to an on-camera interview, but agreed to have the
documents read to him over the telephone. Mapes told the Panel that he confirmed the content of
the four documents and that this was a key factor in bolstering the conclusion that the documents
were authentic.
Major General Hodges told the Panel a different version of his conversation with Mapes.
Major General Hodges said that he did not confirm the content of the documents but only said
that he and Lieutenant Colonel Killian had discussed the fact that Lieutenant Bush had missed a
flying physical and that Lieutenant Bush wanted to transfer to Alabama. Major General Hodges
also told the Panel that he did not believe that Lieutenant Colonel Killian had ever ordered
anyone to take a physical, including Lieutenant Bush. Major General Hodges further told the
Panel that General Walter ("Buck") Staudt had never pressured him regarding Lieutenant Bush,
as alleged in the August 18, 1973 memorandum. Moreover, Major General Hodges said that
when he finally saw the documents after the September 8 Segment aired, he was convinced that
they were not authentic and told this to Rather and Mapes in a telephone call on September 10,
2004.
Major General Hodges gave the Panel a number of specific reasons why he did not
believe that the documents were authentic, including the use of a number of allegedly erroneous
terms and abbreviations. Some of the deviations from standard format and usage mentioned by
Major General Hodges included: (i) the location and format of the signature block; (ii) the
abbreviations for Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Texas Air National Guard, group and officer
efficiency training report; (iii) the use of the terms "billet" and "billets"; and (iv) the reference to
a flight review board. While some of these observations may seem trivial, each branch of the
military uses specified standard abbreviations and terms. Major General Hodges did not think
that Lieutenant Colonel Killian, with whom he served for 20 years, would have written
documents with so many deviations from standard format.
3. Barnes
Interview
On Tuesday, September 7, Rather interviewed Ben Barnes, and a number of excerpts
from this interview appeared in the September 8 Segment. The Panel has several concerns about
whether the airing of the Barnes interview excerpts constituted fair and accurate reporting by
60 Minutes Wednesday. For example, the excerpts pertaining to Barnes conveyed the
12
unmistakable impression that President Bush gained entry into the TexANG through preferential
treatment. Barnes stated, however, that he did not know if his call to a TexANG official back in
1968 made any difference with respect to President Bush. Further, Mapes had been told
previously by several former TexANG officers that President Bush entered the TexANG without
any preferential treatment. Finally, Mapes confirmed to the Panel that there was conflicting
information about whether there even was a waiting list to get in the TexANG as of the spring of
1968. At a minimum, these issues should have been disclosed to the 60 Minutes Wednesday
management, but they were not.
4.
White House Reaction
The morning of Wednesday, September 8, the Killian documents were delivered to White
House Communications Director Dan Bartlett in anticipation of an interview to get a reaction
from the White House. CBS News correspondent John Roberts interviewed Bartlett at around
11 a.m. at the White House. Bartlett did not dispute the authenticity of the documents at that
time but denied in the interview that the documents showed that President Bush did anything
improper during his service in the TexANG. The Panel was informed by West, Howard, Mapes,
Kartiganer and two CBS lawyers involved in the vetting, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard
Altabef, that Bartlett's failure to challenge the authenticity of the documents hours before the
Segment was to air provided further comfort that the documents were authentic.
E.
The Vetting Process
All 60 Minutes Wednesday stories go through a vetting process. The degree of vetting
depends on a variety of factors, including whether the story is an investigative report and what
information is presented in the segment. At a minimum, the vetting of all stories entails a review
by Executive Producer Howard and Senior Broadcast Producer Murphy, a review by Senior
Producer Kartiganer of the excerpts of interviews that are to be used in stories to ensure that they
reflect a fair edit from the full interviews and a final fairness and accuracy screening by West.
Sternberg and Altabef, who have been in-house counsel for CBS for over 20 years each, also
may become involved in the vetting process depending on the type of story and issues involved.
The September 8 Segment should have received the highest degree of vetting because,
among other reasons, the Segment:
1. Was a major investigative piece that was produced in a very short period of time;
13
2. Was pursued intermittently for over five years, which could cause the correspondent
and producer to become too personally invested in the story;
3. Was to be released in the middle of a presidential campaign and was highly negative
to one candidate (President Bush);
4. Involved a source who did not want his identity disclosed;
5. Involved a second source who had never been located by 60 Minutes Wednesday;
6. Relied on documents that could not be verified by their purported author because he
was deceased;
7. Relied on documents that were not originals; and
8. Was the first original story aired under the direction of the new 60 Minutes
Wednesday management team.
The Panel finds that the vetting process for the September 8 Segment was seriously
flawed. The Panel believes that this was caused in large part by the speed with which this
Segment was produced. The Panel also believes that the vetting process was not sufficient
because too much deference was given to Mapes because of her experience and much admired
history at CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday, as well as her association with Rather. Rather
does not appear to have participated in any of the vetting sessions or to have even seen the
Segment before it was aired.
Mapes began to write the script in earnest on Tuesday, September 7. There were several
meetings and screenings to vet the script with various combinations of West, Howard, Murphy,
Kartiganer, Sternberg and Altabef on September 7 and 8. West typically did not get involved in
the vetting process until the story was ready for a final screening. Heyward, however, asked
West by no later than September 7 to become more deeply involved, which evidenced his
recognition that this was an important and potentially controversial story. Thus, Heyward
cautioned West and Howard in an e-mail on September 7 not to be "stampede[d]" and that
"we're going to have to defend every syllable of this one . . ."
Given the significance of the Killian documents, it was critical for the vetters to know the
background, identity, credibility, motivations, biases and other relevant information about the
sources of the documents. All agree that they knew virtually nothing about Chief Warrant
Officer Conn, who at that time was thought to be the ultimate source. Mapes and the vetters
have different accounts as to what she told them about Lieutenant Colonel Burkett. Most of the
14
vetters told the Panel that they did not think they heard the name Bill Burkett as the source of the
documents prior to the airing of the Segment but did know that the source was a former National
Guardsman. Even if the name Bill Burkett had been mentioned, all the vetters said it would not
have meant anything to them.
Significantly, no one said that Mapes gave any indication of the level of controversy in
her source's background. They told the Panel that the source was described by Mapes in
different meetings and conversations on September 6 through 8 in various terms, including
"solid," "without bias," "credible," "a Texas Republican of a different chromosome," a "John
McCain supporter," "reliable" and "a maverick." The only significant negatives about her
immediate source that they described hearing from Mapes were that he had a quarrel with the
National Guard over disability payments, that an investigation that he and three other National
Guardsmen had been directed to conduct concerning the National Guard had been abruptly
stopped and that he was not a supporter of President Bush.
These descriptions are in stark contrast to how Mapes told the Panel she described her
source during the vetting process. First, Mapes said that she did not shield Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett's name from West, Howard, Murphy or Kartiganer. Second, Mapes said that she
provided all of the details of Lieutenant Colonel Burkett's background that she knew to these
same people, that he became a controversial figure in February 2004 when his story about the
"scrubbing" of President Bush's TexANG records had been publicized and challenged, that he
was a "moralistic whistleblower," and that he was one of the most vocal critics of President
Bush's TexANG service. Mapes also claimed that she disclosed less significant details about
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, including the name of his wife, his financial condition and the fact
that he used a dog to assist him with an illness.
As noted above, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had told Mapes on either September 4 or 5
that he received the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Mapes told the Panel that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett told her that Chief Warrant Officer Conn, if contacted by Mapes,
would not confirm that he had provided the documents to him. Mapes said that she attempted to
call Chief Warrant Officer Conn at an address in Texas, but was unable to contact him. Mapes
added that it was her understanding that he was living in Germany, but she did not try to locate
him in Germany. Mapes further told the Panel that since she believed she had independent
15
verification of the content of the documents from Major General Hodges late on Monday,
September 6, she did not believe it necessary to pursue Chief Warrant Officer Conn further.
The Panel finds this explanation difficult to accept. Mapes had known that Chief
Warrant Officer Conn was the alleged source of the Killian documents since sometime on
September 5 at the latest and could not have known in advance that Major General Hodges
allegedly would confirm the content of the documents late on September 6. Further, the
Segment would contain the statement that the Killian documents "were taken from Colonel
Killian's personal files." Mapes told the Panel that she was told this by Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett, but had not been able to corroborate it with Chief Warrant Officer Conn. Thus, it
appears to the Panel that a crash to air the story was under way without effective consideration of
the chain of custody.
In contrast, the vetters told the Panel that Mapes informed them that the source of the
documents received them from another person who could not be located. None of the vetters
recalls hearing Chief Warrant Officer Conn's name or other details about this ultimate source of
the Killian documents. The failure to obtain more information about the chain of custody should
have raised the bar for proof of authenticity. Instead, it was not pursued and Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett's later different version as to how he got the documents would prove to overwhelm
60 Minutes Wednesday's dogged but doomed defense of the Segment.
The Panel finds that the vetters should have asked more questions about the ultimate
source of the Killian documents. Given the importance of the documents to the Segment, the
high sensitivity of the story, and the use in the Segment of the uncorroborated assertion that the
documents came "from Colonel Killian's personal files," it was critical to understand precisely
and in great detail how the source came to acquire the documents. Without a detailed
understanding of the ultimate source of the documents and the chain of custody, the other efforts
to authenticate the documents and their content became that much more critical.
The authentication of the Killian documents is another area where a serious conflict
exists between what the Panel was told by the vetters and what Mapes told the Panel. Mapes
said that she told everyone involved in the story that there were four examiners and that while
two of the examiners (Matley and James Pierce) could not authenticate the documents, they
found "no exclusionary points" that would preclude them from being authentic. Mapes told the
Panel that the statement from the September 8 Segment that "we consulted a handwriting analyst
16
and document expert who believes the material is authentic" was based on conclusions by
Matley. Mapes further told the Panel that she disclosed that a third examiner (Emily Will) had
raised questions, but had deferred to Matley when she was told that he had endorsed the
documents, and that a fourth examiner (Linda James) said she could not authenticate the
documents without reviewing the originals.
The recollections of the vetters concerning what they were told by Mapes about the
document examiners were not always clear or consistent. Most of the vetters told the Panel that
Mapes told them that there were four examiners, including the "Dean" of document examiners
(Matley), who had authenticated all or some of the documents, without any reservation or
qualification. In any event, none of the vetters believed that there were any outstanding concerns
related to the authentication of the documents prior to the airing of the Segment.
Regardless of what was told to the vetters about the examiners, the Panel is seriously
troubled by the vetting process pertaining to the authentication of the Killian documents. Like
Mapes and Miller, none of the individuals involved in the vetting process had any prior
experience in the authentication of documents or handwriting analysis. None of these people
sought to learn more about the document authentication process, including the limitations of
having copies instead of originals. Had any of the vetters spoken to any of the examiners, they
would have immediately realized the challenges posed in attempting to authenticate a copy of a
document.
Mapes also told the Panel that she informed the vetters that the substance of the
documents had been verified by another National Guardsman, Major General Hodges, whose
name was included in an early version of the script that was available to the vetters on
September 8, though his name was not actually used on the air in the final script.6 Mapes told
the vetters that Major General Hodges' confirmation of the content of the documents gave her
significant additional comfort as to the authenticity of the documents.
This alleged confirmation by Major General Hodges started to march 60 Minutes
Wednesday into dangerous and ultimately unsustainable territory: the notion that since the
content of the documents was felt to be true, demonstrating the authenticity of the documents
became less important.
6 However, as noted above, Major General Hodges denied to the Panel that he gave such confirmation.
17
The Panel's investigation included interviewing other people who might have had
knowledge of the content of the documents, but who were not interviewed by 60 Minutes
Wednesday about the documents prior to airing the September 8 Segment. These people
included officers who served at Ellington Air Force Base ("Ellington AFB") with Lieutenant
Colonel Killian, including Lieutenant Colonel Doug Via, former Operations Officer for the 111th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron, and Colonel Rufus Martin, former Personnel Staff Officer for the
147th Fighter Interceptor Group. Neither Lieutenant Colonel Via nor Colonel Martin believed
that the documents were authentic or that their content was correct.
F.
Authenticity of the Killian Documents
The Panel was not able to reach a definitive conclusion as to the authenticity of the
Killian documents. However, Mapes made oral and written presentations to the Panel during its
investigation in an effort to demonstrate that the content of the Killian documents was in fact
authentic. These presentations were done primarily by comparing the Killian documents with
official Bush records to show how well she believed that the Killian documents "meshed" with
the official Bush records.
The Panel finds that the meshing analysis submitted by Mapes does not withstand
scrutiny for two reasons. First, in many instances, the content of the Killian documents does not
mesh well substantively with the official Bush records. Second, the Killian documents vary in
significant ways from the standard format and jargon of documents issued by the 147th Fighter
Interceptor Group in the early 1970s. Thus, the Panel believes that there remain substantial
questions regarding the authenticity of the Killian documents. The Panel believes that careful
reporting prior to airing the Segment should have identified these questions and, at a minimum,
should have delayed the broadcast so that more reporting could be conducted.
In terms of meshing with the official Bush documents and the deviations in format, the
Panel observes the following by way of example:
May 4, 1972 Memorandum. The official Bush records make no mention of this alleged
order for Lieutenant Bush to take a physical, and Guardsmen who served with Lieutenant
Colonel Killian, including Major General Hodges, Lieutenant Colonel Via and Colonel
Martin, told the Panel that they never heard of any such order.
The format of this document varies from standard format:
The signature block is on the right, while standard format was for the
block to be on the left.
18
Lieutenant Colonel Killian's name is listed as "JERRY B. KILLIAN,"
while it was standard for his name to be "JERRY B. KILLIAN, Lt Col,
TexANG."
Fighter Interceptor Squadron in the official Bush records is
overwhelmingly abbreviated as "FIS"; in this Killian document, it is
abbreviated as "F.I.S."
May 19, 1972 Memo to File. The first paragraph pertaining to Lieutenant Bush's
obtaining equivalent training at a location in Alabama meshes reasonably well with the
official Bush records.
August 1, 1972 Memorandum. This memorandum suggests that Lieutenant Colonel
Killian verbally suspended Bush from flying status. However, the official Bush records
document that it was then-Colonel Hodges who suspended Lieutenant Bush and that he
did so solely because Lieutenant Bush had failed to take his flight physical and not for the
additional reason that he had failed to meet TexANG standards.
The format of this document varies from standard format:
Same signature block location and format deviations as with the May 4,
1972 memorandum
Lieutenant Colonel Killian is shown to have used only initials to sign this
document. Lieutenant Colonel Killian always wrote out his full name in
the official Bush records.
This document abbreviates Texas Air National Guard as
"USAF/TexANG." The official Bush records from the 147th Fighter
Interceptor Group abbreviate it as "TexANG."
The memorandum calls for the convening of a "flight review board." The
proper term is "Flying Evaluation Board."
August 18, 1973 Memorandum. This memorandum states that retired General Staudt was
putting pressure on then-Colonel Hodges to provide Lieutenant Bush with a good Officer
Efficiency Report. No official Bush record supports this document and the Guardsmen
interviewed by the Panel, including General Staudt and Major General Hodges, deny that
General Staudt exerted any influence after he retired.
The language in this document varies from standard language:
The standard abbreviation for "Group" was "Gp"; this document
abbreviates Group in two places as "Grp."
This memorandum abbreviates Officer Efficiency Training Report as
"OETR." The official Bush records abbreviate it as "OER," and
Guardsmen confirmed for the Panel that OER is the correct abbreviation.
G. The
Aftermath
Almost immediately after the September 8 Segment aired, there was an escalating
controversy about the authenticity of the Killian documents. The criticisms focused initially on
19
the allegation that typewriters that existed during the relevant period did not have the ability to
create the superscript "th" that was included in the May 4, 1972 and August 18, 1973
memoranda, that they could not have produced the proportional spacing that all four documents
allegedly contained, and that they did not have the Times New Roman font allegedly utilized in
all four documents.
Over the next week or so, CBS News issued a number of press statements and CBS
Evening News reports that staunchly defended the September 8 Segment despite increasingly
strong indications that the reporting for the Segment was flawed. The Panel finds that these
statements and reports contained numerous misstatements and inaccuracies. Moreover, the Panel
finds that once serious questions were raised, the defense of the Segment became more rigid and
emphatic, and that virtually no attempt was made to determine whether the questions raised had
merit.
1.
The Initial Response
The initial response of 60 Minutes Wednesday was to stand by the September 8 Segment,
a concept familiar to many journalists. This defense is only effective, however, when a story can
be proved to be true, even in hindsight. The rush to air and the flawed vetting put 60 Minutes
Wednesday in the untenable position of publicly defending the Segment, but being unable to
prove it.
On Thursday, September 9, in response to growing criticism of the Killian documents on
the Internet and in mainstream media like ABC News and The Washington Post, CBS News
issued its first statement defending the Segment. That statement said that the documents had
been "thoroughly examined and their authenticity vouched for by independent experts." The
Panel finds that this statement is not accurate as no expert had vouched for the authenticity of the
documents.
On Friday, September 10, press coverage about the authenticity of the documents
intensified. In an effort to respond to the mounting criticism, CBS News issued a statement that
the September 8 Segment "was not based solely on recovered documents, but rather on a
preponderance of evidence, including documents that were provided by unimpeachable
sources. . . . . In addition, the documents are backed up not only by independent handwriting and
forensic document experts, but sources familiar with their content." The Panel finds that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett could not be reasonably described as an "unimpeachable source,"
20
given his own inconsistent public statements, as well as his criticisms of President Bush and the
National Guard. Further, the statement was inaccurate because the Killian documents were not
backed up by forensic document experts.
The CBS Evening News on September 10 included a report that stated that an official
Bush record from 1968 included the same superscript "th" as in the Killian documents and that
the owner of a company that distributes typeface said that Times New Roman typeface had been
available since 1931. Moreover, the report continued that "[d]ocument and handwriting
examiner Marcel Matley analyzed the documents for CBS News. He says he believes they are
real . . . ." The report then included an excerpt of the September 6 interview with Matley in
which he discussed only the signature on one of the documents and not the authenticity of the
documents themselves. Finally, the report stated that Lieutenant Strong was "standing by his
judgment that the documents are real" and replayed the excerpt of his interview from the
September 8 Segment.
The Panel finds a number of deficiencies with the September 10 CBS Evening News
report. First, while an official Bush record did include a superscript "th," it is far different in
appearance from the superscript "th" in the May 4, 1972 and August 18, 1973 memoranda.
Second, while Times New Roman typeface may have been available since 1931, the Panel
understands that it was only available in typeset machines and not in typewriters during the
period the Killian documents were allegedly written. Third, neither Matley nor Lieutenant
Strong ever authenticated the documents or said that they were "real." Fourth, no one asked
Lieutenant Strong after the Segment aired and before the September 10 report whether he was
"standing by his judgment."
Friday, September 10, should have been a watershed day in dealing with the growing
controversy about the Segment. First, CBS News President Heyward, concerned about
mainstream media's increasingly critical reporting about the Segment, directed Betsy West early
that morning to investigate the details of the examiners' opinions and confidential sources that
allegedly supported the Segment. No such investigation was done at that time. Had this
directive been followed promptly, the Panel does not believe that 60 Minutes Wednesday would
have publicly defended the Segment for another 10 days.
Second, during the day, three events took place that should have alerted CBS News
management that the reporting for the Segment may have been flawed. First, the CBS News
21
strategy to get 60 Minutes Wednesday's document examiners to defend the Segment was not
followed, as only Matley made an appearance. As noted above, Matley did not attest to the
authenticity of the documents. Second, a respected typewriter expert, Peter Tytell, contacted
Miller and Howard and explained in detail why he believed the Killian documents were likely
fakes. His views were not pursued or analyzed in part because 60 Minutes Wednesday was
searching only for experts who would defend the September 8 Segment. Third, Major General
Hodges contacted Mapes and Rather and told them that Mapes had misquoted him about his
alleged confirmation of the Killian documents and now that he had had the opportunity to review
them, he believed that the documents were not authentic. Neither Mapes nor Rather asked Major
General Hodges to explain why he believed the documents were not authentic and the Panel
finds no discussion of this conversation with others at CBS News at the time.
Thus, within two days following the airing of the September 8 Segment, 60 Minutes
Wednesday ignored significant opportunities to take a fresh look at the reporting that allegedly
supported the Segment. This was especially unfortunate because the criticisms of 60 Minutes
Wednesday thereafter only continued to mount.
Another unsettling disclosure occurred on Saturday, September 11. The media reported
that General Staudt had retired from the TexANG on March 1, 1972, approximately 18 months
before Lieutenant Colonel Killian allegedly had written the memorandum about General Staudt's
trying to "sugar coat" Lieutenant Bush's officer efficiency report. This obviously triggered
questions among the media about how General Staudt could have had such influence well after
retiring, but it did not trigger any re-examination by 60 Minutes Wednesday of its reporting.
Instead, Mapes told 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel that General Staudt remained influential
after his retirement. That representation went unchallenged. The Panel's investigation suggests
that it is doubtful that General Staudt exerted any such influence after he retired.
On Monday, September 13, the CBS Evening News aired yet another report on the
continuing controversy about the Killian documents, despite misgivings by the CBS Evening
News' Executive Producer that CBS News had anything new to report. The report said that
"CBS used several techniques to make sure these papers should be taken seriously, talking to
handwriting and document analysts and other experts who strongly insist that the documents
could have been created in the 70s." The report included excerpts from an interview of Bill
Glennon, described as a technical consultant, who said that typewriters in the 1970s could have
22
produced a superscript "th" and proportional spacing. The Panel finds this statement
unpersuasive as Glennon conceded to the Panel that he was not a typography expert and did not
say which typewriters would have had those capabilities. Moreover, he did not know what type
of machine allegedly produced the Killian documents. Nevertheless, Rather closed this CBS
Evening News report by stating that CBS News "believes the [Killian] documents are authentic."
2.
The ABC News Report
Another significant rebuke to 60 Minutes Wednesday's defense of the Segment occurred
on September 14. ABC News' World News Tonight on that date featured two of the original four
document examiners, Linda James and Emily Will, who had reviewed certain of the Killian
documents for 60 Minutes Wednesday prior to the airing of the September 8 Segment. James
and Will told ABC News that they did not authenticate the documents and that they had each
raised concerns about the documents prior to the September 8 broadcast with 60 Minutes
Wednesday personnel. James and Will said that these concerns were not addressed by anyone at
60 Minutes Wednesday.
60 Minutes Wednesday learned before the airing of the ABC News broadcast that Will
and James were going to express their concerns about the documents publicly. In response,
Matley and James Pierce, the other examiners who had been retained by 60 Minutes Wednesday
prior to the September 8 Segment, were asked by Miller to prepare letters confirming the
authenticity of the documents. Matley's initial letter stated that he only addressed whether the
purported "Jerry B. Killian" signatures were done by the same person and concluded that "the
preponderance of the available handwriting evidence was that one writer made all the signatures
examined." There is no mention in the original letter about the authenticity of the documents.
Pierce's conclusion in his initial letter was that "[t]he findings of the aforementioned physical
evidence strongly suggest the probability that the documents in question are authentic."
60 Minutes Wednesday received revised letters from Matley and Pierce. While it was not
clear who suggested changes to the letters, handwritten notes on the initial drafts indicate that
West and Sandy Genelius, a member of the CBS Communications Group, provided proposed
edits to a representative of 60 Minutes Wednesday, who then provided the proposed edits to
Matley and Pierce. In the revised letters, which were posted on the CBS News website, Matley
added a sentence that "I observed nothing about the documents that could disprove their
authenticity." Pierce revised his conclusion to state "[I]n my professional opinion, with what I
23
know and have examined based on the photocopied questioned documents, the documents in
question are authentic."
Pierce would not agree to be interviewed by the Panel. However, in a conversation with
counsel to the Panel, Pierce stated that a representative of 60 Minutes Wednesday asked him to
strengthen his conclusion and that he informed her that it did not represent his views. He said
that he told the representative that he would provide an unqualified opinion since he was asked to
do so by 60 Minutes Wednesday, but only if the letter was not made public. Pierce told counsel
to the Panel that he further told the representative that 60 Minutes Wednesday would "get in
trouble" if it made his letter public. Nevertheless, the revised letters from Matley and Pierce
were posted on the CBS News website.
3.
The Statements of Marian Carr Knox
A further rebuke to 60 Minutes Wednesday's defense of the September 8 Segment
occurred on September 14. On that date, an interview with Marian Carr Knox, a clerk typist who
worked with Lieutenant Colonel Killian during the relevant time period, was quoted in a Dallas
newspaper. Knox stated in the interview that she did virtually all of Lieutenant Colonel Killian's
typing and that she did not believe that the documents were authentic, although the content
reflected Lieutenant Colonel Killian's feelings. She was contacted by 60 Minutes Wednesday
and agreed to do a televised interview. Knox was flown to New York and interviewed by Rather
on September 15.
The interview with Knox was shown on 60 Minutes Wednesday on September 15. In that
segment, Knox, who was described by Rather as a "credible voice," said that she did not type the
documents. While she did state in the interview that she did not think the documents were
authentic, she added that she did believe that the facts included in at least some of the documents
reflected Lieutenant Colonel Killian's beliefs at the time.
The Panel spoke with Knox on two occasions, and she stated that she did not have any
personal knowledge about the content of any of the Killian documents, aside from the fact that
she knew Lieutenant Bush had sought to transfer to Alabama so that he could run a political
campaign. She informed the Panel that she answered Rather's questions on the assumption that
the content was accurate. She made clear in her Panel interviews that she did not have any
personal knowledge about the thrust or content of the documents.
24
4.
The Change in Source
In light of the interviews of James, Will and Knox questioning the authentication of the
documents, Heyward directed West to accompany Mapes to Texas to interview Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett about the documents. Before that occurred, a conference call was held on
Thursday, September 16 among Heyward, Rather, West, Mapes and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett.
The call lasted about three hours. Among other things, Lieutenant Colonel Burkett
acknowledged that he did not get the documents from Chief Warrant Officer Conn, but had
identified him as the source only because of pressure by Mapes to name his source and because
he wanted to protect the actual source. He then disclosed that his actual source was a woman
who identified herself as Lucy Ramirez. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett said he received a call from
Ramirez after he had been interviewed extensively by the media in February 2004 in connection
with his published claim that some of President Bush's TexANG records had been purged.
Ramirez told Lieutenant Colonel Burkett that she had some documents related to President
Bush's TexANG service that she wanted to give to him. They arranged for him to receive the
documents at a livestock show in Houston in early March 2004, where an unidentified man
delivered the documents. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett agreed to repeat this information in an on-
camera interview and it was agreed that Rather would travel to Texas and interview Lieutenant
Colonel Burkett on Saturday, September 18. Rather interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Burkett on
that date, and Lieutenant Colonel Burkett repeated his story about obtaining the documents from
an unidentified man at the livestock show in Houston.
5. The
Apology
On Monday, September 20, the CBS Evening News aired a report in which Rather stated
that CBS News could "no longer vouch for [the Killian documents'] authenticity." As one of the
reasons for this position, the story prominently cited the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Burkett had
changed his story and said that he got the documents from a different source that could not be
verified. The Panel finds this statement confusing, since 60 Minutes Wednesday had never
verified the original source from whom Lieutenant Colonel Burkett initially said he received the
documents. Moreover, the source of the documents was not the sole factor in determining
whether the documents were authentic.
25
On that same day, Rather was interviewed at length by Marcia Kramer at WCBS, the
CBS-owned television station in New York City. In the interview, Rather made clear that the
blame for the airing of the September 8 Segment lay with 60 Minutes Wednesday personnel. The
Panel finds these statements to have been far more appropriate than the CBS Evening News
broadcast on September 20.
Rather told the Panel that he delivered the apology and gave the WCBS interview in
support of CBS News' decision that the time had come to stop defending the Segment and,
indeed, to disown it. He told the Panel, however, that he did not fully agree with this decision
and still believes that the content of the documents is accurate. The Panel is troubled by these
conflicting statements.
6.
The Contact With the Kerry Campaign
Another troubling aspect of the September 8 Segment emerged in the public disclosure
on September 21 that Mapes had been in contact with Joe Lockhart, a senior staff member of the
Kerry presidential campaign, in connection with the production of the Segment. Mapes told the
Panel that before Lieutenant Colonel Burkett turned over any of the documents, he had pressed
her to arrange for him to be put in touch with someone from the Kerry presidential campaign so
that he could provide the campaign with strategic advice on how to rebut the attacks by the
"Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" group. Mapes told the Panel that she did not know anyone from
the Kerry campaign, but got Lockhart's telephone number from Chad Clanton, a Kerry campaign
official who had been quoted by Mapes' husband, a newspaper reporter, in an article on an
unrelated matter.
Mapes also told the Panel that before calling Lockhart, she discussed this request with
Howard and that he approved the contact. Mapes said that Howard had reasoned that reporters
exchange information from various sources and this request was not problematic. Howard,
however, told the Panel a very different version of this conversation and said that he clearly
informed Mapes that it would be inappropriate to intervene with Lockhart or anyone else
associated with the Kerry campaign on Lieutenant Colonel Burkett's behalf.
Mapes further told the Panel that at some point prior to September 8 she spoke to
Lockhart. According to Mapes, Lockhart called her and the conversation lasted only
approximately two minutes. Mapes told the Panel that she merely informed Lockhart that
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett wanted to speak with him. She did not think she described
26
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as a source or that the subject of the documents ever came up during
the call.
Lockhart told the Panel a contrasting version of this conversation. Lockhart said that
Clanton, who reported to Lockhart, had asked Lockhart to take a call from Mapes about a story
she was working on related to President Bush's TexANG service. Lockhart told the Panel that
Clanton said that the story involved documents and that a call from Lockhart to a 60 Minutes
Wednesday source who wanted input into the Kerry campaign might assist 60 Minutes
Wednesday in obtaining the documents from the source. Lockhart was reluctant to speak with
Mapes given that he did not want to give the impression that the campaign was assisting on the
matter. Lockhart said that he agreed to speak with Mapes only after he was assured by Clanton
that Mapes already had obtained the documents in question and that the reporting stage of the
story was complete.
Lockhart informed the Panel that Mapes called him on the evening of Saturday,
September 4. Lockhart said that she told him that she had lined up an interview with Ben Barnes
and had obtained documents that had been authenticated by some number of experts. Lockhart
stated that Mapes said that there may be more documents and Mapes asked him to call
Lieutenant Colonel Burkett, whom she described as a source for the story. Lockhart said that it
was his impression that a call to Lieutenant Colonel Burkett could be helpful in obtaining the
additional documents.
Lockhart told the Panel that he did not immediately call Lieutenant Colonel Burkett as he
recognized it could be perceived negatively. However, he ultimately changed his mind and
spoke to him on Monday, September 6, by which time Mapes had received the rest of the Killian
documents. Lockhart said the call lasted less than five minutes and that Lieutenant Colonel
Burkett gave his opinion on how the campaign should address the Swift Boat issue. Lockhart
stated that he said very little during the call and the subject of documents never came up.
The Panel is unable to resolve definitively the conflict between the accounts of Howard
and Mapes concerning whether permission was given to speak with a representative of the Kerry
campaign in connection with the TexANG story. Whether or not permission was given to
Mapes, the Panel finds this contact to be highly inappropriate. The September 8 Segment had a
strong political focus and it was to air in the middle of a hotly contested presidential campaign.
While it is certainly proper to receive information from a variety of sources, this contact crossed
27
the line as, at a minimum, it gave the appearance of a political bias and could have been
perceived as a news organization's assisting a campaign as opposed to reporting on a story.
H. Political
Agenda
The Panel is aware that some have ascribed political motivations to 60 Minutes
Wednesday's decision to air the September 8 Segment just two months before the presidential
election, while others further found political bias in the program itself. The Panel reviewed this
issue and found certain actions that could support such charges. However, the Panel cannot
conclude that a political agenda at 60 Minutes Wednesday drove either the timing of the airing of
the Segment or its content.
Given that the Panel does not believe that political motivations drove the September 8
Segment, questions likely will be raised as to why these massive breakdowns occurred on this
story at an organization like CBS News with its heritage and stated commitment to the highest
standards of journalism. The Panel heard from many that the Rather/Mapes team was a
formidable force at 60 Minutes Wednesday. Great trust was placed in Mapes, a highly respected
producer who had just produced a widely acclaimed segment on the Abu Ghraib prison abuses,
and vast deference was given to Rather, the "face" of CBS News. These factors, along with the
"crash" of the production, contributed greatly to the failures of the September 8 Segment and the
Aftermath.
I. Recommendations
The Panel concludes that the September 8 Segment reflected a widespread breakdown of
fundamental processes at 60 Minutes Wednesday. CBS News has an historic and deep-seated
commitment to accurate and fair reporting, and the Panel was impressed by the fact that so many
of its personnel have been with CBS News for many years and appear fully committed to the
Standards of accuracy and fairness that CBS News has articulated. That makes it all the more
difficult for the Panel to understand how this breakdown could have occurred.
While the Panel was not asked to look at any other segments of 60 Minutes Wednesday, it
did not find any evidence that the flaws of the September 8 Segment carried over to any other
segment. More than a few of the staff members interviewed by the Panel likened this breakdown
in the production of the September 8 Segment to a "perfect storm," in which a confluence of
factors came together and led to the failures. The Panel believes that there is some basis for this
28
analogy, as the combination of a new 60 Minutes Wednesday management team, great deference
given to a highly respected producer and the network's news anchor, competitive pressures, and
a zealous belief in the truth of the Segment seem to have led many to disregard some
fundamental journalistic principles, including but not limited to: tracking down the chain of
custody for the Killian documents; thoroughly understanding everything relevant about the
confidential sources; thoroughly understanding the document authentication process and what
the 60 Minutes Wednesday experts actually did and said; and thoroughly understanding the
corroboration process for critical information, such as the lack of personal knowledge of
Lieutenant Strong and the failure to attempt to show Major General Hodges the critical Killian
documents before the Segment was aired.
However, the "perfect storm" analogy cannot be used as an excuse. The fact is that basic
journalistic steps were not carried out in a manner consistent with accurate and fair reporting,
leading to countless misstatements and omissions in the reporting by 60 Minutes Wednesday and
CBS News. Those misstatements and omissions lead the Panel to conclude that it is not
sufficient simply to exhort those responsible to do better in the future. The Panel believes that
certain process changes must be put in place to strengthen controls so that similar problems are
less likely to occur in the future.
In making these recommendations, the Panel is mindful that no system can totally prevent
a breakdown, particularly a system such as that at 60 Minutes Wednesday which depends so
heavily on the trust and integrity of the individual participants. The Panel urges CBS News to
consider implementing the recommendations set forth in Chapter XI, including but not limited
to, the following:
· Create a new senior Standards and Practices position ("Standards Executive"),
outside of the production structure of 60 Minutes Wednesday and reporting directly to
the President of CBS News, whose mission would be as follows. Before airing any
60 Minutes Wednesday segment that involves investigative reporting, confidential
sources or the authentication and/or chain of custody of materials received from
outside sources, the Standards Executive must be consulted and must review whether
proper processes have been followed. The Panel observes that CBS News has had a
person in charge of "Standards and Practices," but this position has not been tasked to
function as outlined here. The Standards Executive should have the authority to delay
or veto the segment.
· The Standards Executive would also be identified throughout 60 Minutes Wednesday
as someone with whom the staff can communicate on a confidential basis, without
29
fear of retaliation, if they have concerns that a planned story or segment may not meet
CBS News' Standards of accuracy and fairness, or for any other reason.
· If the validity of information presented in a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment comes
under a significant challenge, such as occurred with the September 8 Segment,
reporting on the challenge should not be left largely or entirely in the hands of those
who created the segment at issue. Instead, an additional team, led by someone not
involved in the original segment, should be assigned to take the lead in the coverage.
The Panel notes that once the attacks began on the September 8 Segment, essentially
the same people who developed the challenged segment had control of the news
reports defending it. This resulted in opportunities for other news organizations to do
the reporting that exposed serious problems in the Segment.
· The same standards for accuracy and fairness prescribed by CBS News' Standards
Manual for its news stories should be applied to its press releases and public
statements. That did not consistently occur here, as our Report on the Aftermath
illustrates. CBS News management and the CBS Communications Group should
coordinate their efforts and develop a protocol that accomplishes this objective.
· Competitive pressures are a fact of life in journalism and may impact the timing of a
news story. The leadership of CBS News should make clear to all personnel that
competitive pressures cannot be allowed to prompt the airing of a story before it is
ready. It would have been better to "lose" the story on the Killian documents to a
competitor than to air it short of investigating and vetting to the highest standards of
fairness and accuracy.
· In sensitive stories relying on sources who cannot be identified on the air, senior
management must, as appropriate, know not just the name of the source, but all
relevant background that would assist in news decisions. Limitations in this regard
must be reviewed with the Standards Executive that the Panel has proposed.
30
III.
PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION
The Panel and its counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP, conducted
the investigation in a completely independent manner.7 CBS News did not control or influence
the scope of the investigation or the methods employed by the Panel. CBS News did not have
any input or influence with respect to the findings of the Panel, other than to commit itself at the
outset to make this Report public.8 The Panel received full cooperation from CBS News and its
personnel, including those who might have reason to believe that this Report would contain
findings critical of their work. Significantly, the Panel was given access to personal notes and
the investigative materials of many of the people, including Mary Mapes, involved in the
reporting of the September 8 Segment.
The Panel assembled a vast quantity of information to support its findings. All
information obtained by the Panel during the process was done by voluntary means. The Panel
reviewed thousands of pages of scripts, e-mails, news releases, investigative notes, military
records and other relevant documents. The Panel also interviewed 66 individuals who had
knowledge of relevant events. This included 32 people from 60 Minutes Wednesday and CBS
News and 8 people who had been affiliated with the TexANG during all or part of the period that
President Bush served in it. Several of those interviewed from CBS News were not involved in
the September 8 Segment, but had information or background the Panel believed relevant to its
work.
The Panel spoke to every person at CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday who played
any substantive role in the production of the September 8 Segment, as well as those who were
involved in a significant way in the news reports and press statements following the airing of the
Segment. The Panel interviewed many people on more than one occasion to ensure that it
received all of the necessary information and to provide people with a complete opportunity to
provide the Panel with any relevant information. Mary Mapes and her counsel provided several
7 In addition to the attorneys listed on the signature page of this Report, the Panel expresses it great appreciation for
the outstanding work and commitment of Matthew B. Bowman and Jennifer Shuttleworth, project manager and
administrative assistant, respectively, at Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP.
8 The Panel provided, on December 29, 2004 a substantially completed draft of its Report to Leslie Moonves,
chairman of CBS, Linda Mason, a vice president of CBS News responsible for interpreting the Standards of CBS
News, and two CBS attorneys just before it was submitted in final form to CBS News. None of these individuals
were involved in the production or vetting of the September 8 Segment, nor in the Aftermath. The purpose of the
review was to verify for the Panel that the Report contained a proper description of the Standards and processes at
CBS News, as well as to identify any potential issues of libel.
31
written submissions to supplement her interviews with the Panel. These submissions proved
helpful to the Panel's considerations.
No court reporter was present at the interviews, but the Panel and its counsel took
detailed notes. There were instances when the recollections of certain individuals interviewed
were not consistent with the recollections of others. The more significant differences are noted
in this Report. The Panel found that e-mails prepared contemporaneously with events proved to
be particularly valuable in refreshing recollections of those interviewed and in assisting the Panel
in determining which recollections seemed more credible.
With two notable exceptions, the Panel was able to speak with the individuals the Panel
believed were important to its investigation. The Panel requested on several occasions the
opportunity to speak with Lieutenant Colonel Bill Burkett and Chief Warrant Officer George
Conn. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett initially informed the Panel that he did not believe that he had
been treated in a professional or ethical manner by CBS News and did not want to speak with the
Panel. The Panel also invited Lieutenant Colonel Burkett to make a written submission or
respond to written questions submitted to him by the Panel. Lieutenant Colonel Burkett never
provided a definitive response to these requests but did later inform the Panel, through an
intermediary, that he would consider providing information to the Panel if it was agreed that the
Panel would not include such information in its Report. The Panel could not agree to such a
condition. Chief Warrant Officer Conn did not respond to two requests made by the Panel to be
interviewed. Despite this, the Panel believes that it has obtained a substantial record on which to
base its findings and recommendations.
Notwithstanding its findings of numerous deficiencies related to the reporting, production
and vetting of the September 8 Segment and its Aftermath, the Panel was impressed with the
professionalism, dedication, commitment and intelligence of the individuals it interviewed from
CBS News and 60 Minutes Wednesday. Many of these individuals have been associated with
CBS News for many years and expressed great pride and respect for the organization and its
mission. Many spoke, often with emotion, of their "love" for CBS News. Some expressed
disbelief that CBS News could find itself in the situation created by the September 8 Segment.
CBS News has had a proud and storied tradition, and the Panel believes that it would be a
substantial loss if the troubled episode under discussion here were somehow allowed to diminish
its journalistic commitment or investigative zeal.
32
The Panel expects that some may ask why it took from September 22, 2004, the date this
Panel was announced, until January 5, 2005 for the Panel to issue its Report. The primary reason
is that the investigation needed to be much broader than initially anticipated. The Panel believed
at the outset that its investigation would focus primarily on the Killian documents. While the
Killian documents were, indeed, important to the investigation, it also became clear relatively
early in the Panel's work that the problems affecting the Segment and its Aftermath involved
much more than the Killian documents. The Panel and its counsel devoted essentially full time
to this endeavor since September 22 and completed the Report in as thorough and expeditious a
manner as possible.
33
IV. BACKGROUND
A.
60 Minutes The Sunday Show
CBS News divides its news programming into two categories: "hard" news and news
magazines. The hard news division includes the CBS Evening News, the CBS Morning News,
The Early Show, CBS News Sunday Morning, Face The Nation, Up To The Minute, and certain
other special events and political coverage. The news magazine division includes 60 Minutes,
60 Minutes Wednesday and 48 Hours.
60 Minutes debuted on September 24, 1968 as television's first news magazine show.
60 Minutes became one of the most popular shows in television, finishing in Nielsen's Top Ten
programs for 23 consecutive seasons, a record unmatched by any other program. Now in its 37th
season, the show has developed into a "blend of hard-hitting investigative reports, interviews,
feature segments and profiles of people in the news." 60 Minutes is still a top-rated show and
airs on Sunday evenings.
B.
60 Minutes Wednesday
In the middle of the 1998-1999 season, CBS News launched a weeknight edition of
60 Minutes with a separate staff of management, producers and correspondents. The new show
was billed as having "the signature style, journalistic quality and integrity of the original
60 Minutes." Originally entitled 60 Minutes II, the broadcast has since been renamed 60 Minutes
Wednesday and includes regular reports from the show's own correspondents, periodic pieces
from other CBS News journalists and updated reports on previous 60 Minutes Wednesday
stories. 60 Minutes Wednesday airs Wednesday nights at 8 p.m. Eastern time.
Several differences between 60 Minutes and 60 Minutes Wednesday were described to the
Panel. For example, 60 Minutes Wednesday was created to appeal to a "younger and jazzier"
demographic group than the original 60 Minutes audience. Although both shows gravitated
toward a team model, people familiar with the operation of both broadcasts told the Panel that
60 Minutes Wednesday correspondents typically have less contact with their producers and
associate producers than their counterparts at 60 Minutes because several 60 Minutes Wednesday
correspondents have additional responsibilities. For example, Dan Rather is not only a
60 Minutes Wednesday correspondent, but he also is the Anchor and Managing Editor of the CBS
34
Evening News. Charlie Rose, a 60 Minutes Wednesday correspondent, also hosts a show on
PBS.
Another difference is that all of the 60 Minutes producers, associate producers and senior
management have offices on the same floor and seem to interact a great deal, while the
60 Minutes Wednesday production staff is located on a different floor from the senior
management of the show. The Panel was told by some that this physical separation makes it
more difficult for the 60 Minutes Wednesday staff and management to interact effectively.
35
V.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY
A. Introduction
The following chart9 depicts the hierarchy of those involved in the reporting, production
or vetting of the September 8 Segment:
Senior Vice President, Prime Time
Betsy West
Executive Producer
Josh Howard
Senior Broadcast Producer
Senior Producer
Mary Murphy
Esther Kartiganer
Correspondent
Dan Rather
Producer
Mary Mapes
Associate Producers
Roger Charles
Yvonne Miller
Lucy Scott
Michael Smith
In addition, two CBS lawyers, Jonathan Sternberg and Richard Altabef, also were involved in the
vetting. A more detailed description of the roles of the various individuals involved follows.
B.
Description of the Organization
1.
Correspondents, Producers and Associate Producers
The correspondents for 60 Minutes Wednesday are ultimately responsible for the
production of the stories that air and are expected to exercise oversight over their producer
teams. In practice, the degree of oversight exercised by correspondents varies, with some being
very involved in their producers' work on a regular basis while others give great authority and
9 This chart is not intended to include every individual in the 60 Minutes Wednesday structure. There were a number
of other individuals involved in the production of the Segment.
36
freedom to their producers. The correspondents at 60 Minutes Wednesday who have other
responsibilities, including Rather, tend to delegate significant responsibilities to their producers.
During the relevant time period, Rather had substantial additional responsibilities on his already
full schedule as anchor and Managing Editor of the CBS Evening News, as he was also anchoring
CBS News' coverage of the Republican Convention in New York from Monday, August 30
through Thursday, September 2, and he traveled to Florida to cover Hurricane Frances on Friday,
September 3, through late afternoon on Sunday, September 5.
Producers at 60 Minutes Wednesday are primarily responsible for researching and
developing stories and are assisted by associate producers. A producer and associate producer
gather facts and put a story together. It is also the producer and associate producer's
responsibility to put interview transcripts into context, so that a story fairly and accurately
reflects the contents of the interviews conducted. Producers also typically have the greatest role
in drafting the script for a segment. Thus, there is a great amount of responsibility and trust
placed in the producers.
Mary Mapes has served as a producer for Rather on 60 Minutes Wednesday since the
show's inception. During that time, she produced more than 30 stories for the show. Her stories
have covered a wide variety of topics, including death penalty cases, an interview of Strom
Thurmond's biracial daughter, an interview of George Clooney, an interview of former First
Lady and current Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and, notably, the Abu Ghraib prison story.
Mapes was considered by everyone at CBS News with whom the Panel spoke as "a superstar"
reporter and producer, and some of her superiors said that they stood in awe of her work.
Mapes was given permission to engage three part-time freelance associate producers to
assist her on the TexANG story: Colonel Roger Charles, a former Marine officer, who also
assisted Mapes on the Abu Ghraib prison story; Mike Smith, an Austin-based freelance journalist
who had worked on stories pertaining to President Bush for many years;10 and Lucy Scott, a
Dallas-based former CBS News Sunday Morning producer. In addition, late on September 2,
2004, Yvonne Miller, an experienced associate producer who regularly works with another
producer assigned to Rather, was asked to assist on the production of the Segment. Miller knew
Mapes but had never worked with her before. The associate producer who had worked with
10 Smith spent portions of 1997-99 working with Bill Minutaglio in writing First Son, which was published in 1999
and is generally considered to have been an objective book about then-Governor Bush.
37
Mapes since 1998 did not work on the September 8 Segment because she had left for maternity
leave on August 11, 2004.
The time to produce a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment once the reporting is complete can
last for several days or several weeks. There is no typical process or timeline. In fact, it is not
unusual for a "crash" piece to be written in less than 24 hours. The term "crash" is used to
describe a segment that is produced within a very short period of time. Crashes are generally
day-of-air reports, such as coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and are less often investigative
journalism pieces.
2.
Executive Producer and The Senior Broadcast Producer
The Executive Producer is involved in approving a story concept proposed by a
correspondent or producer and has varying involvement in the production of the segment. When
a correspondent/producer team nears completion of a 60 Minutes Wednesday segment, a detailed
review or vetting process begins. The Executive Producer is ultimately responsible for
everything that goes on the air.
The Executive Producer's top assistant, a Senior Broadcast Producer, works closely with
the Executive Producer to form the senior management team of 60 Minutes Wednesday. The
Senior Broadcast Producer is generally deeply involved in both the production and vetting
processes.
3.
Additional Layers of Review
Besides the Executive and Senior Broadcast Producers, there are at least three other
layers of review. First, the Interview Reviewer has both a formal and informal role in the
vetting. The current Interview Reviewer at 60 Minutes Wednesday, Senior Producer Esther
Kartiganer, has more than 40 years of experience at CBS News and is viewed as a valued voice
in the vetting process. Kartiganer's formal role is to review excerpts of interviews used in a
segment and to compare them to the full interview transcripts (and interview notes when
necessary) to determine whether the excerpts are a fair and accurate portrayal of the full
interview. Kartiganer's informal role is to raise questions about any aspect of a proposed
segment that may catch her attention, regardless of whether they involve edits of an interview.
On any proposed segment that may have legal implications, CBS lawyers, likely Jonathan
Sternberg and Richard Altabef, become involved in the vetting process. Like the Interview
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Reviewer, they have both formal and informal roles. The formal role is to protect CBS News
from potential legal liability.
The Panel was told that the lawyers do not always limit their involvement to a review of
the legal issues. Given that they each have been with CBS for more than 20 years, their views on
editorial content and other matters are valued. For example, with respect to the September 8
Segment, Sternberg and Altabef asked questions about the source of the documents and the
authentication process and whether the Ki